Podstawy aksjologiczne ograniczenia prawa do głosowania nad układem w postępowaniach restrukturyzacyjnych
AbstractThe article discusses the axiological background and the inherent values lying at the root of the provisions of the Restructuring Law which restrict certain creditors from exercising their right to vote in relation to the approval of composition arrangements in the course of restructuring proceedings. The axiology which leads to the exclusion of creditors who are connected in various ways with a debtor range from family connections to corporate relationships within the group of companies to which the debtor belongs. The potential for emotions to prevail in the case of family members or the unclear financial and business connections stem from the management and ownership corporate relationships are seen as a contradiction to the concept of an ideal creditor, who analyses the pros and cons of the prospective arrangement. A different axiology drives the exclusion of creditors who purchase debts after the initiation of restructuring proceedings. The article concludes that, as opposed to prevailing doctrine, the exclusion of those who purchase debts is driven not by the value of keeping such purchasers out of the restructuring picture, but rather to protect the opening of a market of debt trading in which a fair price can be achieved.
|Other language title versions||The Axiological Background of Restrictions on the Right to Vote on Composition Arrangements in Restructuring Proceedings|
|Journal series||Law and Forensic Science, [UWM Law Review], ISSN 2080-9670, (B 4 pkt)|
|Publication size in sheets||0.5|
|Keywords in English||restructuring law, creditor’s right to vote|
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